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Law
Moderator: Hon. William H. Pryor Jr., U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh
Circuit
Friday, November 17, 2006
Washington, DC
JUDGE PRYOR: The topic for this panel is, if not the most heated and
important debates of constitutional law, certainly one of them: Executive Power
in Wartime.
President Bush has asserted that he has far-reaching executive powers based
on Article II of the Constitution, including war-making powers not restricted by
act of Congress and not subject to the oversight of the federal judiciary. The
President has, for example, approved surveillance of enemy communications
that begin or end within the territorial limits of the United States without first
seeking warrants from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court under the Act
that created it.
2
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld this summer, the Supreme Court ruled that detainees
of the United States military in Guantdnamo, Cuba are entitled to habeas corpus
review of the detention.3 The President and Congress recently responded to that
decision by stripping the courts of habeas jurisdiction and providing exclusive
review of the military tribunal on enemy combatant status in the United States
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.4
1. © 2007, Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy. This article is adapted from a panel
discussion held on Friday, November 17, 2006 in Washington, D.C.
2. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1801-11 (2000)); see Press Release, The White House, Setting the Record
Straight: Democrats Continue to Attack Terrorist Surveillance Program (Jan. 22, 2006), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/20060122.html.
3. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2798 (2006).
4. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (to be codified at 10
U.S.C. §§ 948a-948d).
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Has the President acted legally? Has Congress exceeded its constitutional
powers? What role, if any, should the judiciary have in mediating these dis-
putes? How best should the balance of power between the three branches be
struck? For a discussion of these issues, the Federalist Society has assembled a
distinguished panel of experts. I will introduce each panelist in the order in
which he will speak, and each will speak for about 10 minutes before we open it
up for some discussion among the panel, and then for question-and-answers
from the audience.
To my far left, Richard Epstein is the James Parker Hall Distinguished
Service Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, where he has taught
since 1972. He has also been the Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow at the
Hoover Institution since 2000, and presently is the director of the John M. Olin
Program in Law and Economics. He's written numerous books and articles on a
wide range of legal and interdisciplinary subjects. He's a graduate of Columbia
College, Oxford University, and the Yale Law School.
To his right, Roger Pilon is Vice President for Legal Affairs at the Cato
Institute, where he holds the B. Kenneth Simon Chair in Constitutional Studies.
He's the founder and director of Cato's Center for Constitutional Studies and
the publisher of the Cato Supreme Court Review. Dr. Pilon holds a bachelor's
degree from Columbia University, a Masters and Ph.D. from the University of
Chicago, and a law degree from the George Washington University School of
Law.
To my right, Geof Stone is the Harry Kalven, Jr., Distinguished Service
Professor of Law at the University of Chicago. A member of the law faculty
since 1973, Mr. Stone served as dean of the law school from 1987 to 1994 and
provost of the University from 1994 to 2002. After graduating from the Univer-
sity of Chicago Law School, he served as a law clerk to Judge J. Skelly Wright
of the U.S. Court of Appeals in the D.C. Circuit, and then to Justice William
Brennan of the Supreme Court. His most recent book is Perilous limes: Free
Speech in Wartime from the Sedition Act of 1798 to the War on Terrorism.
John Yoo, to his right--our last speaker-is a professor of law at the
University of California Berkeley School of Law, Boalt Hall, where he has
taught since 1993. From 2001 to 2003, he served as a deputy assistant attorney
general in the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice, where he
worked on issues involving foreign affairs, national security, and separation of
powers. Professor Yoo received his B.A. summa cum laude in American history
from Harvard University. In law school, he was an articles editor of the Yale
Law Journal. He clerked for Judge Laurence Silberman of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. He joined the Boalt faculty in 1993 and then
clerked for Justice Clarence Thomas of the Supreme Court. He's the author of
The Powers of War and Peace: Foreign Affairs and the Constitution After 9/11,
and the forthcoming War by Other Means: An Insider's Account of the War on
Terror.
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Please join me in giving a warm welcome to our first speaker, Professor
Epstein.
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN: Ten minutes is what our time is, right?
JUDGE PRYOR: Yes.
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN: It is a very great honor to be here to speak about a
topic that necessarily creates deep divisions even within the ranks of the
Federalist Society. This topic is not one of the standard issues that I usually
raise and discuss in these meetings. It has nothing to do with the distribution of
powers between the national government and the states, where my own view is
that Congress's power is sharply circumscribed. In the context of war powers
and foreign affairs, the constitutional text and its complex history reveals very
serious tensions. Our question is how best to resolve them.
As a general matter, let me state this conclusion: looking to the constitutional
text, it seems clear to me that the President's claim of extensive powers under
Article II of the Constitution is woefully overstated and generally insupportable.
If you next look at the history, it shows that the President has had in practice
greater power and freedom of action than is given to him under the Constitu-
tion.5 So we have here one of these classic difficulties of trying to reconcile a
text, which seems to be strongly weighted in favor of Congress with a series of
practices in which the Executive has asserted a bit more power than the
Constitution, in strict terms, authorizes. Resolving that tension between text and
practices raises, I think, an extremely difficult problem. In this short talk, I shall
spend most of my time worrying about the structuralist and originalist argu-
ments, and worrying less about the history of presidential activity after the
signing of the Constitution.
One of the constant themes of the Federalist Society has always been,
perhaps a little bit too slavishly, a belief in originalism, original intent, basic
constitutional design, and structure. I have no particular objection against this
approach as a methodology, so long as we recognize that nothing you can say
by way of abstraction will excuse you from the task of figuring out very closely
what a particular document says and how its various parts move together. And
in looking at this problem, the general principle of separation of powers and
checks and balances, which animates the entire Constitution, is of enormous
importance.
The Founders of the Constitution, I think, all started with the same position,
that if you have a safe that contains valuables, like the liberty of the people and
their security, you don't want to give all the keys to the safe to a single person.
What you want to do instead is to figure out how to divide the power in ways
that are consistent and coherent and, then, to create checks in each branch of
government over what can be done in another branch. A general endorsement of
5. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding President Roosevelt's
Executive Order creating internment camps for American citizens of Japanese ancestry during World
War I).
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the twin principles of separation of powers and checks and balances does not
answer the specific question of exactly what division and what checks apply in a
particular setting. In order to answer that particular question, you have to
patiently sift through the various provisions to see how they interlock.
In tackling that interpretive issue, in light of these foundational principles, we
should assume that the Framers sought to put together a coherent set of
procedures. Accordingly, we should be suspicious of any claims that say that,
"a-ha, in organizing our constitutional position, the Framers left a great deal of
flexibility how these powers were allocated." More concretely, we should be
suspicious that the Framers would have authorized more than one path from
peace to war under the Constitution. In my own view, that supposed flexibility
is a recipe for disaster. In trying to figure out how the Constitution works, you
want to stress consistency and coherence first, and only thereafter worry about
flexibility in the joints, which should never operate as your primary mode of
analysis.
In this point, I think the most instructive point is the sequence of the Articles
of the Constitution. Article I comes before Article II, which comes before
Article III. To address the issue of war powers, it is best to follow that
Constitutional sequence down. On the issues of war and peace, it's clear that the
explicit powers that are given to Congress are very expansive and comprehen-
sive. They cover military operations in general, and I disagee with any formula-
tion of the question that holds that any powers that the Congress has over the
Executive are less in wartime than they are in time of peace. There is absolutely
nothing in the Constitution which seems to change the balance of powers
between the various branches as a function of whether the nation is at peace or
at war.
The basic architecture of Article I gives, as we all know, Congress the power
to declare war.6 The word "declaration" in this particular context conveys the
view that the nation has one way of switching from a state of peace to a state of
war. Owing to the gravity of the issue, that choice-war or peace-is quintessen-
tially a collective national decision that should not be lightly made or made by
any single person. If you go further down the list of powers in Article I, section
8, you also discover that Congress has the power "to make rules for the
government and regulation of the land and naval forces" and that explicit power
applies both in peace and war.7 The questions, what do we mean by "rules" or
by "government" or by "regulation" are, I think, always subject to some degree
of dispute at the edges. Nonetheless, any general proposition about how the
armed forces should conduct certain kinds of military activities in either peace '
or war seems to fall squarely within congressional power, even though the
execution of these rules in particular cases is surely left to the President under
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
7. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
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his Article II powers.'
And if you read still further, there's a very interesting procedure that provides
that Congress shall have the power to designate the rules "to provide for the
calling forth of the militia to execute the Laws of Union, suppress Insurrections,
and repel Invasions[.]" 9 There is nothing in the Constitution which, absent
congressional authorization, allows the President in his commander-in-chief
role to call the militia into active service no matter how great the peril. And as
Article II is worded, the President becomes their commander-in-chief when
they're called into active service. The passive voice in Article I is designed to
indicate that he does not have unilateral power to make the militia a federal
force-a big issue at the time of the founding.
Article II has a slightly different configuration. It says, of course, that the
President shall be the commander-in-chief of the army and the naval forces and
the militia when called into actual service.' It does not use the word "power" to
describe his position. John Yoo and I have had this ongoing debate as to
whether the use of the words "shall be" as opposed to the use of the words
"have the power" has any particular significance.' In this particular context, I
think that the difference matters, and for this reason: if the Constitution gave the
President a commander-in-chief "power," then that particular power would give
him the ability to initiate conflicts on his own motion. That outcome creates a
genuine contradiction in the constitutional structure, which is not required (or
welcome) under any views of separation of powers or checks and balances.
Think of it this way: Congress has the power to declare war, yet the President
has the power to make war without bothering to wait for the congressional
declaration. That manifest tension is resolved against presidential power by
noting that the President's role as commander-in-chief does not give him any
power, express or implied, that is in outright conflict with the power that the
Constitution has already vested in the Congress.
So what then precisely is the role of the commander-in-chief? Why is that
portion of Article II so important in the overall constitutional scheme? I think
there are many reasons why the President's role is absolutely vital, and none of
them, I think, support the extensive claims of executive power made by
President Bush. One vital point is that the President's commander-in-chief
power subjects the military to civilian control. There is no general in the Army
who can outrank the President of the United States. So our long and salutary
8. See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 139 (1866) (Chase, J., dissenting) ("The power to make
the necessary laws is in Congress; the power to execute in the President.")
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
10. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
11. Id. ("The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States ...."); id. § 2, cl. 2 ("He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties ...."); see generally Richard Epstein, Executive Power, The Commander in Chief and
The Militia Clause, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 317, 320-21 (2005); John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional
Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1674-76 (2002).
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tradition of making the military subservient to effective civil control is, in fact, a
direct and vital consequence of Article 11.12
Article II also gives the President a key monopoly over that particular
function. Congress can do nothing consistent with the framework of the Consti-
tution to make somebody else the commander-in-chief of the military. Congress
cannot, by any form of legislation, sidestep the constitutional authority of the
President to discharge this key function. Both of these key consequences are
wholly consistent with the view that the President doesn't have the power,
expressly or impliedly, to declare war or to start international conflicts on his
own initiative.
In understanding this structure, it is also useful to reflect on contemporary
understandings of the division of power. The single most important document
for explicating the commander-in-chief role is, I think, Federalist Paper No.
69.13 It contains very explicit language about the President as the first and
foremost of the generals and admirals. 14 Even so, he's still a general and he's
still an admiral. Federalist 69 also explicitly states that the President, as
commander-in-chief, does not have the broad powers of the English Kings or
12. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 ("The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of
the United States ... .
13. THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 349-50 (Alexander Hamilton) (Bantam Books ed., 1982). Federalist
69 argues:
The President is to be the commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and
of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States. He
is to have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except
in cases of impeachment.... In most of these particulars, the power of the President will
resemble equally that of the king of Great Britain and of the governor of New York. The most
material points of difference are these:-First. The President will have only the occasional
command of such part of the militia of the nation as by legislative provision may be called
into the actual service of the Union. The king of Great Britain and the governor of New York
have at all times the entire command of all the militia within their several jurisdictions. In this
article, therefore, the power of the President would be inferior to that of either the monarch or
the governor. Second. The President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the
United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the king
of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than
the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and
admiral of the Confederacy; while that of the British king extends to the declaring of war and
to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies-all which, by the Constitution under
consideration, would appertain to the legislature. The governor of New York, on the other
hand, is by the constitution of the State vested only with the command of its militia and navy.
But the constitutions of several of the States expressly declare their governors to be command-
ers-in-chief, as well of the army as navy; and it may well be a question, whether those of New
Hampshire and Massachusetts, in particular, do not, in this instance, confer larger powers
upon their respective governors, than could be claimed by a President of the United States.
Id. Note that Hamilton does not use the word "power"-to describe the commander-in-chief. He does use
it in the next clause dealing with reprieves and pardons. On both issues he tracks the constitutional text
precisely.
14. Id. at 350.
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even the powers of the governments in the various states.' 5 And the word they
use to describe this position is one of inferiority. 16
So what does that, then, tell us about how well the President fares on his
various claims of inherent executive authority by virtue of being a unitary
executive? Well, the first point is you have to distinguish very sharply between
the word 'unitary' on the one hand and the talk about "inherent Presidential
authority" on the other. There is a unitary Executive, i.e. only one President.
Our Constitution does not call for two consuls as they did in Rome. There is
only one leader with these powers; that's probably wise. But the idea that the
unitary executive confers vast residual powers on the President-powers that in
fact explicitly contradict those powers that that the Constitution has given to
Congress-seems to me to be very dangerous. In looking at something like
FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act),1 7 whether one likes it or not-
basically I'm moderately sympathetic with its general scheme-one has to
come to the conclusion that those statutory requirements count, at the very least,
rules and regulations that govern the operation of the land and military forces.
In addition, they certainly address the scope of congressional power in dealing
with foreign commerce. Taken as a whole it becomes very difficult to conclude
that there's no congressional authorization to limit the President in these ways.
In addition, it is instructive to look at the various cases in which the President
has operated on his own initiative. Virtually all of them did not fly in the face of
a statutory prohibition on presidential power, which is a very different world
from the one we have today, now that Congress has decided to occupy the
field.' 8
In working through this analysis, there will always be kinds of loose points
based on our constitutional history. It's not perfectly clear, for example, what it
is that we mean by a declaration of war. We often use the term "authorization"
of military conflicts so as to give some flexibility as to when or whether we
engage in war; I think that approach is perfectly consistent with the constitu-
tional scheme, because the authorization means that the President cannot act
unilaterally, so that a key check on its power is preserved. In addition, there are
certain some kinds of low-level military activities that probably don't rise to'the
level of being war. I do not think that the Constitution demands declarations of
war before trying to rescue individuals taken prisoner overseas and similar
kinds of low-level interferences. But nonetheless, we can say with complete
confidence that the major claims of untrammeled and unchecked executive
power are indefensible if the President may decide to bomb Russia today, such
that the only thing that Congress can do, as John Yoo suggests, is to withhold
appropriation in the next two years. That distribution of powers strikes me not
15. See id.
16. Id.
17. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1972) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-71 (2000)).
18. See id.
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as an implementation of our constitutional scheme, but as its total perversion.
Thank you.
DR. PILON: Our subject today is executive power in wartime, and the
context, of course, is the War on Terror the United States has waged since 9/11
and the President's assertion of executive power that has led many to charge
"Imperial Presidency." Let me say at the outset that I'm less concerned to
defend the Bush Administration's use of its powers than the powers themselves.
Because I'm going to defend a fairly robust conception of executive power in
foreign affairs, I need also to add that I'm speaking here for myself, not for the
Cato Institute, where several of my colleagues take a different view.19
Moreover, I'm going to focus on just two aspects of the question: the
President's power to wage war,20 and the administration's NSA surveillance
program.21 In the few minutes I have I'm going to be able simply to sketch the
arguments, of course.
I want to begin, however, with the context, because how we view what's
happening goes far, I believe, toward explaining why the debate has been so
intense. Are we at war? By historical standards it doesn't seem so. Yet the
attacks of 9/11, killing 3000; the bombings around the world since then, from
Bali to Great Britain; and the threats that arise daily are hardly ordinary crimes.
Around the world in -recent years, tens of thousands have been killed by the
deliberate acts of Islamic terrorists.
The great question before us, then, is whether we're engaged in war, or mere
law enforcement. I suggest that how you come down on that will largely
determine how you see the administration's actions. Were we more clearly at
war, the questions would be far fewer. But we're not. And to cloud matters even
further, the enemy today is in our midst, as 9/11 demonstrated, not in uniforms
abroad. That makes waging war all the more difficult and drawing neat legal
lines all but impossible. Ask the Israelis.
Yet if this is war, as I believe it is, then our aim cannot simply be to prosecute
terrorists ex post. We must prevent their acts ex ante, just as MI-5 did recently
with flights out of Heathrow. 22 But in an asymmetrical war, how do we do that
consistent with a Constitution dedicated to liberty and limited government? 23 I
19. See, e.g., GENE HEALY & TtMoTHY LYNcH, CATO INSTnUTE WHITM PAPER, POWER SURGE: THE
CONSTnUTIONAL RECORD OF GEORGE W. BUSH (2006), available at http://www.cato.org/pub-display.php?
pub id=6330.
20. For a fuller discussion, see Roger Pilon, The War Powers in Brief: On the Irreducible Politics of
the Matter, 2 CARDozo PUB. L., POL'Y & ETHICS J. 49 (2003).
21. See Roger Pilon, Executive Checks on the Imperial Congress, 7(2) THE PoLMc: THE YALE C. J.
POL. 14 (Summer 2006).
22. See "Airlines Terror Plot" Disrupted, BBC NEWS, Aug. 10, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
uk news/4778575.stm.
23. Given the views I will be setting forth here, I should make it clear that I have defended the
liberty and limited government understanding of the Constitution repeatedly over the years, and that
continues to be my understanding. See, e.g., Guns and Butter: Setting Priorities in Federal Spending in
the Context of Natural Disasters, Deficits, and War: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Federal
[Vol. 5:309
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submit that the answer is closer at hand than many have noticed. Quite simply,
in foreign affairs, unlike in domestic affairs-and here is where I part company
with Richard-the Constitution is deliberately underdetermined, and it bows to
the executive.
That underdetermination means that neither side here will be able to speak
apodictically. Nevertheless, as between executive and congressional suprema-
cists, the weight of the evidence, I believe, is on the side of executive su-
premacy, which brings me to my central thesis: The efforts by Congress in
recent years and courts of late to insinuate themselves into foreign affairs are
fundamentally at war with the theory and history of the Constitution, to say
nothing of our security. Shocking as this may be for a room full of lawyers to
hear, foreign affairs are fundamentally political, not legal.24
Let me develop that thesis first, and very briefly, with the most basic foreign
affairs power-the power to make or wage war-where the fundamental consti-
tutional question is: May the president wage war absent a congressional declara-
tion of war? In the state of nature, John Locke tells us, where everyone not
specially related to us is a foreigner, each of us has the "Executive Power," the
power to defend his rights by whatever means may be necessary and proper for
self-preservation.25 That is the power we yield up to government in the original
position, dividing it in a way that will ensure its effective use, on one hand,
while avoiding abuse, on the other.
We did that through our Constitution, of course, starting with the vesting
clauses, which tell us that Congress' powers are enumerated, whereas the
executive and judicial powers are plenary, save where they are reserved, shared,
or otherwise delegated. No part of Locke's Executive Power is lost, however.
The only question is where the various parts rest. Thus, the power to declare
war rests with Congress.26 But that's not the same as the power to make or wage
war. Those are discrete powers, as the theorists of the 17th and 18th centuries
understood. 7 Declaring war puts the nation in a state of war. It is a juridical
power. British kings had the power both to wage and to declare war. They often
declared war in the midst of war, moving the nation from an imperfect to a
perfect war.
Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security of the
S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. (2005) (testimony of Roger
Pilon, Vice President for Legal Affairs, B. Kenneth Simon Chair in Constitutional Studies, Director,
Center for Constitutional Studies, the Cato Institute), available at http://www.cato.org/testimony/
ct-rp102005.html, reprinted as ROGER PILON, THE UNITED STATES CONSTITTION: FROM LimITED GOVERN-
MENT TO LEViATHAN, 45(12) (2005). Properly understood, there is no inconsistency between government
limited in scope but armed with robust powers to secure the liberty of citizens against both internal and
external threats.
24. I develop that point more fully in Roger Pilon, Foreword: Politics and Law, Again, 2006 CATO
Sup. CT. REV. vii.
25. JOHN LOCKE, Tvo TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 13 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960) (1690).
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
27. See JoHN Yoo, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CoNsTrrunON AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER
9/11, at 143-52 (2005).
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The Framers understood that distinction too, as the slim record shows. During
the convention, they famously changed the grant to Congress from the broader
power to "make" to the narrower power to "declare" war.28 What, then, became
of the power to make war? It remained where it always was, as part of the
Executive Power that we yielded up, to be exercised by the commander-in-
chief.
Now to be sure, congressional supremacists often point to Madison's conven-
tion notes, which say that he and Elbridge Gerry moved "to insert 'declare,'
striking out 'make' war; leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden
invasions. '29 But if "sudden invasion" was meant to limit the executive, it is an
odd instrument for that end. Moreover, there is no shortage of evidence cutting
the other way, such as Madison's famous response to Patrick Henry at the
crucial Virginia ratifying convention: "The sword is in the hands of the British
King. The purse is in the hands of Parliament. It is so in America, as far as any
analogy can exist.",
30
Thus, Congress has the power, if it wishes, to restrain a president bent on war,
but the Declare War Clause is not the source of that power. It is a blunt
instrument, unsuited for the purpose, and fraught with danger, too-be careful
what you ask for.31 And history demonstrates its limited use. Over the past 200
years, presidents have sent troops into hostilities abroad over one hundred
times, yet on only five such occasions has Congress declared war.32 Are we to
suppose that those other occasions were all ultra vires and unconstitutional?
Courts addressed that question fairly clearly in 2000 in Campbell v. Clinton.3 3
War is a consummate political affair. That is why presidents ought to go to
Congress-not to get authorization, which they don't need, but to get the
support of the people. Of course, the last thing we need is judges telling us that
an invasion was not "sudden enough" to warrant a presidential response. We are
not there yet, fortunately.
But if presidents may wage war without a declaration of war, and have
throughout our history, they surely must have the implicit power to gather the
28. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 418-19 (Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott
eds., 1987).
29. Id.
30. 10 THE DocuMENrARY HISTORY OF THE RATwiCATION OF THE CONSTrrUTION 1282 (John P. Kaminski
& Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1993).
31. Indeed, numerous federal statutes kick in under a formal declaration of war, enabling the
government to requisition ships, abrogate contracts, and do much else that would otherwise not be
allowed. E.g., 50 U.S.C. § 82 (2006) (authorizing the creation of obligatory contracts for ships or war
material on the President's terms, the modification or cancellation of existing contracts, and the
requisition of factories for government use); see generally 78 Am. JUR. 2D War § 6 (2002) (outlining the
effects of a declaration of war).
32. RIcHARD F. GRIMMETr, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, INSTANCES OF USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED
FORCES ABROAD 1798-2004 (Oct. 5, 2004), available at http://www.history.navy.mi/library/online/
forces.htim.
33. 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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intelligence necessary to do that. We come, then, to my second concern: the
NSA surveillance issue. Let's note first that foreign intelligence gathering is a
'round-the-clock affair, done during war and peace alike. Every president since
George Washington has engaged in this practice. Indeed, the duty to do so is
entailed in the oath of office.
In 1978, however, reacting to certain abuses, Congress insinuated itself into
the matter when it enacted FISA, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,34 a
complex scheme for regulating that presidential duty. Judge Richard Posner has
well stated the practical problems with FISA: It may serve, he said, "for
monitoring the communications of known terrorists, but it's hopeless as a
framework for detecting terrorists. It requires that surveillance be conducted
pursuant to warrants, based on probable cause to believe that the target of
surveillance is a terrorist, when the desperate need is to find out who is a
terrorist[,]''35 which he likens to looking for a needle in a haystack. And on the
technical side, many others have noted how hopelessly out of date FISA is in
the modem world of digital communications.36
Practical and technical problems aside, the questions for us are legal. Only
one court, of course, three months ago, has ever found that the NSA program
violates the Fourth Amendment, 37 in an opinion from which all but the editorial-
ists at the New York Times have sought distance. 38 More thoughtful administra-
tion critics, including two on this panel, point rather to the FISA statute, then
add, in response to the President's constitutional objections, that even conceding
that the President may gather intelligence abroad, "Congress indisputably has
authority to regulate electronic surveillance within the U.S." 3 9-the very place,
let me note, where we want most to gather that intelligence in this War on
Terror.
The issues here are far too complex to be addressed in the couple of minutes I
have left-indeed, the Federalist Society has published a 135-page answer to
the critics, which I commend to all.40 But for all that complexity, the dispute
boils down in the end to the simple question of whether the President is the
34. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811, 1821-29, 1841-46, 1861-62 (2000)); S. REP. No. 95-604(I), at 15
(1977) ("[FISA] would relegate to the past the wire-tapping abuses brought to light during the
Committee hearings by providing, for the first time, effective substantive and procedural statutory
controls over foreign intelligence electronic surveillance.").
35. Richard A. Posner, A New Surveillance Act, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 2006, at A16 (emphasis
added).
36. See, e.g., K.A. Taipale, Whispering Wires and Warrantless Wiretaps: Data Mining and Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance, 7 N.YU. REV. L. & SEcUarrv (SUPPLEMENT) (June 2006).
37. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 775 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
38. Compare Editorial, Ruling for the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2006, at A16, with Editorial, A
Judicial Misfire; The first federal court on warrantless NSA surveillance is full of sound and fury,
WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2006, at A20.
39. Letter from Scholars of Constitutional Law & Former Government Officials to Congress (Jan. 9,
2006) in TERRORIST SURVEn.LANCE AND THE CONSTITUTION (The Federalist Society, n.d.).
40. TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE AND THE CONSTITUTION (The Federalist Society, n.d.).
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nation's principal agent in matters of war and peace and, if so, whether
Congress has the authority to try to micromanage the exercise of that power.
Madison, Jefferson, Hamilton, and most others in the founding generation were
quite clear on the point. Here is Madison: "All powers of an Executive nature,
not particularly taken away must belong to that department,', 41 with Jefferson
adding, "Exceptions are to be construed strictly."42-a rare point of agreement
between Jefferson and Hamilton.
Indeed, where precisely among Congress's enumerated powers is the font of
its claim to intrude on this inherent presidential power? The power "to make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces"?43
That's the power to establish a system of military law and justice outside the
ordinary jurisdiction of the civil courts. The Necessary and Proper Clause?"
That's the power to afford the means for carrying into execution the various
other powers of government, not the power to impede another branch in the
performance of its constitutional duties. At bottom, the critics invite us to
believe that a power presidents have exercised unproblematically for nearly 200
years can be restricted by the mere stroke of a congressional pen-and to
believe further that during this year that Congress has fiddled over revising
FISA to meet the new realities, the President should have abandoned the
surveillance program.
Yet the cases say nothing of the sort. Youngstown,45 which the critics often
cite, the Keith case of 1972,46 the In re Sealed Case of 2002,47 which was the
only decision the FISA appeals court has ever handed down, all clearly distin-
guish domestic surveillance for ordinary law enforcement purposes from for-
eign intelligence gathering. Citing United States v. Truong Dinh Hung,48 which
dealt with pre-FISA surveillance based on "the President's constitutional respon-
sibility to conduct the foreign affairs of the United States,"49 the FISA appeals
court said, "[t]he Truong court, as did all the other courts to have decided the
issue, held that the President did have inherent authority to conduct warrantless
searches to obtain foreign intelligence information .... We take for granted that
the President does have that authority and, assuming that is so, FISA could not
encroach on the President's constitutional power.",5
0
Let me conclude by stepping back just a bit. What we're seeing here, I
41. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Jun. 21 1789), in JAMES MADISON: WRmNGS
465-566 (Library of America 1999).
42. 16 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 378-79 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1961) (emphasis in original)
[hereinafter JEFFERSON].
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
44. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
45. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
46. United States v. United States Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
47. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).
48. United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (1980).
49. Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 717.
50. Id.
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submit, is the latest stage of the Progressive Era, about which Richard has
written so colorfully and correctly-for the Cato Institute, no less!5' (I should
know: I commissioned and edited the book.) In the 1930s, Progressives essen-
tially rewrote the Constitution, submitting to the tender mercies of congres-
sional micromanagement vast areas of life that the Constitution had left to
private ordering. Having largely completed the effort by the late '60s and the
Great Society, they turned their attention to two areas the Constitution had left
mainly to political ordering-campaign finance and foreign affairs. The Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971;52 the draconian amendments of 1974,53 to say
nothing of the recent McCain-Feingold Act; 54 the War Powers Resolution of
1973; 5 5 the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 56-all are efforts by
Congress to micromanage what until then had largely been ordered by politics.
And in each case, Congress has made a mess of things, of course, to no one's
surprise.57
Law is a safeguard against the rule of man, to be sure. But overdone, law
itself is tyrannical. The social engineers of the '30s sowed the seeds of the
modem regulatory state under which so many today are suffocating. The same
58dovthahubris, in Hayek's sense, drove the activists of the '70s to believe that they too
could order and micromanage campaign finance and foreign affairs through
comprehensive regulatory schemes-and here too the predictable and predicted
results are before us. FISA led to the pre-9/11 "wall" between law enforcement
and counterintelligence, as frustrated agents would later testify.59 We can't
afford that kind of micromanagement-nor does the Constitution permit it. Here
again the Founders got it right when they left these political questions to
politics.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR STONE: Let me begin by saying that when we talk about the
President's authority in his role as commander-in-chief, it's important to distin-
guish between two different conceptions of that authority. The first is the
President's power to act as commander-in-chief in the absence of any congres-
sional authorization or limitation. To the extent the commander-in-chief author-
51. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, How PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION (2006).
52. 2 U.S.C. § 431 (2000).
53. Act of Oct* 15, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
54. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).
55. War Powers Resolution of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-1478, 87 Stat. 555 (1973).
56. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11, 1821-29, 1841-46, 1861-62).
57. In the campaign finance area, see Eric S. Jaffe, McConnell v. FEC: Rationing Speech to Prevent
"Undue" Influence, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 245; Allison R. Hayward, The Per Curiam Opinion of
Steel: Buckley v. Valeo as Superprecedent? Clues from Wisconsin and Vermont, 2006 CATO SUP. CT.
REv. 195.
58. See generally F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM (W.W. Bartley Iln ed.,
Univ. of Chi. Press 1989) (1988).
59. Neil A. Lewis, Superior Says He Didn't See Agent's Report on Moussaoui, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22,
2006, at A22.
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ity carries with it a set of implied powers, we can say-that the President may act
in a reasonable and proper manner to fulfill his responsibilities as commander-in-
chief. But there will be outer boundaries. For example, the President, as
commander-in-chief, cannot constitutionally set the price of chicken in peace-
time in Nebraska. That would be a violation of the Constitution because the
President would be exceeding his power as commander-in-chief, if he claims
that was the source of his authority. That's going to be a reasonably broad
power within the realm of issues relating directly to the military security of the
United States. That's one way of defining the commander-in-chief power.
The second approach is to define the core of the commander-in-chief author-
ity. This represents the authority that cannot constitutionally be limited by
legislation and that in some instances can even exempt the President from what
would otherwise be the commands of the Constitution. Those are very different
conceptions of the commander-in-chief authority, and it's important to keep
them separate.
What too often happens in debates about this question is that people conflate
the first with the second. That is, they think that because the President might
have the power to do something as commander-in-chief he is therefore exempt
from any legislative or other constitutional check on his authority. That's a
serious defect of reasoning. So, for example, suppose the President could
institute electronic surveillance of non-citizens overseas in order to gather
information to strengthen the military and national security missions of the
United States. That would be clearly within the commander-in-chief power. No
one would argue that the President was exceeding the boundaries of his
constitutional power in instituting such a program. Similarly, the president has
the authority as commander-in-chief to decide where the military forces of the
United States should be stationed around the world. That concept of the
President's commander-in-chief power has not been at issue in any of the recent
disputes over the scope of the President's authority. The question instead has
been whether attempted limitations on the President's authority are unconstitu-
tional because they impair his authority as commander-in-chief. An example is
the FISA statute that you just heard about from Roger, with whom I strongly
disagree. Another example is the government's detention of Jos6 Padilla. An-
other would be the President's Executive Order with respect to military commis-
sions.
Let me take a moment or two to elaborate. In the NSA case, as Roger said,
before 1978 there were no explicit statutory limitations on the authority of
presidents to engage in foreign intelligence surveillance. This all changed in
1978. Two developments were relevant. First, during the Watergate investiga-
tions, many investigative abuses came to light. Second, in 1972, the Supreme
Court, in the Keith case, unanimously rejected the claim that the President had
inherent authority to engage in domestic national security wiretaps-without
probable cause and a warrant. At the same time, the Court put aside the question
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of whether the same holding would be true for foreign intelligence surveil-
lance.60 That was an open question.
Against this background, Congress in 1978 enacted the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act.6' By the way, it's important to note that when we ask whether
Congress can constitutionally limit the President, what we really mean is
whether the government can constitutionally limit the President because, after
all, when FISA was enacted, it was signed by the President. In any event, FISA
clearly attempted to restrict foreign intelligence surveillance to situations where
there was probable cause and a warrant obtained from a special FISA court,
which was created in order to meet the unique security concerns of foreign
intelligence surveillance.62 And, so far as we know, the requirements of FISA
were complied with by every president until George W. Bush.
Now, what is the argument for the President deciding to disregard FISA? The
argument is either that FISA is unconstitutional or that Congress has authorized
the President to disregard FISA. Both arguments have been made by the Bush
administration. The second argument is truly bogus, so we should dismiss it
first. The argument is that the Authorization to Use Military Force, authorizing
the use of force against those who committed 9/11, was intended to and had the
effect of abrogating the President's responsibilities under FISA. That might be a
plausible argument, but for the fact that FISA itself explicitly anticipated
declarations of war and provided that even in the event of a declaration of war
the President shall have 15 days in which to act outside the limitations of FISA,
but only 15 days.63 And if the President wants to seek an amendment to FISA,
he should go to Congress and seek an amendment.
Now, it may be, as Roger said, that FISA is out of date, and it may be that in
light of 9/11, we would want to authorize the President to engage in much more
aggressive foreign intelligence surveillance than FISA permits. Both of those
propositions are perfectly plausible. But the proper way-the legal way, the
constitutional way-for the President to address that question is for him to go to
Congress and seek an amendment to FISA. That's clearly the process FISA
anticipated. The proper course was not for the President secretly to disregard
FISA-I'll come back to the secretly point in a moment-and to institute, in
defiance of the law, a program that, in my view, clearly was unlawful. Rather, it
was for the President to say FISA is no longer appropriate in light of changing
technology and world conditions, and to propose that Congress amend or repeal
the law. Then there could have been a debate on the proposal..The Padilla case
is another example. Here, the President secretly decided that he has the inherent
authority as commander-in-chief to seize an American citizen at O'Hare Air-
port, to bring him to a military base, not to inform anyone-friends, family,
60. United States v. United States Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 308, 322 (1972).
61. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-62 (2000)).
62. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1803-04.
63. Id. § 1811.
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coworkers, neighbors-that he has been seized by the United States govern-
ment, to hold him incommunicado in a military base, not give him any access to
a lawyer, and not allow him any judicial determination as to the legality of his
detention. 64 The President made his own, secret determination that he has the
unilateral authority to detain an American citizen in circumstances that the
Supreme Court implicitly held in the Hamdi case 65 clearly violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. No thoughtful and responsible lawyer
could believe to the contrary.
. Now, again, if the President wanted the power to do this, if he thought that
the circumstances facing the United States were so dire that he needed the
authority secretly to seize American citizens, hold them incommunicado for as
long as he wanted, with no hearing, no lawyer, then he could have gone to
Congress and said, "I want this power." Congress could then have decided
whether it was an appropriate power, and eventually the Court could have
decided whether that power violated due process. But instead, the President
instituted this process on his own, in secret, not seeking any congressional
approval, and attempting to hide his conduct from the judiciary and the public.
Frankly, I don't see any possible argument one could make that this authority is
inherent in the commander-in-chief power. Indeed, such conduct completely
moots the right to habeas corpus. Keep in mind, we're not talking now about
Guantdnamo Bay; we're not talking about non-citizens. This is, in my view, the
most reckless claim of executive authority in the history of the United States,
and surely it does not comport with the Constitution.
My final observation is that there are two dangers, at least, in such overly
aggressive assertions of executive authority. One is, of course, the violation of
separation of powers-the arrogation to the Executive of authority to do things
without the opportunity of the Congress to weigh in. But the other, even more
troubling danger is secrecy. Not only was the President attempting to act
without congressional authorization, but he was attempting to act without
anyone's knowledge. And that, in my view, was the real reason he did not go to
Congress to seek authority to do what he did to Jos6 Padilla and what he did
with the NSA. The President did not want to ask permission because he knew
that to propose such power might be a problem politically. And so he just did it.
That is not consistent with the American constitutional system. It is devious, it
is dishonest, and it is dangerous to the American system of law.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR YOO: Thank you to the Federalist Society for inviting me to
speak at 6 a.m. my time this morning. I don't know why they chose to do that.
It's also a great pleasure to be on this panel with these distinguished commenta-
tors and professors. We've been having, I think the four of us, a running debate
64. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430-31 (2004); id. at 456-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at
458 n.3; see id. at 442 (majority opinion).
65. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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in the press and in different locations about these issues. It's great to actually be
all in one place at one time.
First, I think Roger did an excellent job of sort of summarizing the formalist
case for presidential power growing in response to war and emergency. I will
just supplement that with a functional approach. If you were to supplement the
formalist case with a functionalist argument-this is one that really does stretch
back to John Locke, and then to the Federalist Papers-which was the idea that
the Executive Branch would be the one that was most effective at waging war
because it had unity, secrecy, and the ability to act with decision. These thinkers
also held the idea that the legislature could not anticipate future problems,
future emergencies, and written antecedent laws.66
The very notion or idea of executive power was not just that it would execute
the written laws but that when the public safety required it, it would be able to
act quickly to respond to those kinds of things. I don't think that's actually
inconsistent with what Geof described as the first type of argument about
executive power, and that's actually how I would characterize it in, say, a
wiretapping program. It was a response to a great attack that was clearly
unforeseen by those who wrote the FISA law. The President had to respond
quickly, and at some times secretly, in order to intercept these kinds of communi-
cations with terrorists inside and outside the United States. You wouldn't, at
first, want to have a broad public discussion about it because in doing so, you
would be tipping off the enemy of our technological advantages in being able to
intercept their communications.
I think the President has now said, and I think it has become clear, that this
program has been able to pick up communications that have led to the acquisi-
tion of actual intelligence that has led to the prevention of attacks on the
country.67 I think it's very much an action that was consistent with Locke's view
of the Executive.
Let me also supplement what Roger said with a discussion of history; not the
framing period of history but the history of our country in wartime since the
framing. I would throw out this argument. The basic thesis I have is that the
greatest presidents-the ones if you look at the polls of all the political
scientists and historians and law professors of who our greatest presidents
are-have been the ones that have drawn most deeply upon this reservoir of
66. See Yoo, supra note 27, at 30-54 (2005); see also Paul Gewirtz, Realism in Separation of Powers
Thinking, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 343 (1989); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to
Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 488-94 (1987).
See generally Stephen L. Carter, From Sick Chicken to Synar: The Evolution and Subsequent De-
Evolution of the Separation of Powers, 1987 BYU L. REv. 719 (explaining Supreme Court decisions
adjudicating congressional and executive constitutional authority disputes); Abner S. Greene, Checks
and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CH. L. REV. 123 (1994) (exploring the
congressional regulation theory of executive power).
67. 152 CoNG. REc. HI5 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 2006) (The State of the Union Address By the President
of United States); see also JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S Accourr OF THE WAR ON
TRRORiSM, ch. 5 (2006).
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constitutional power, have made at times what people at the time thought were
dictatorial, extraordinary claims of executive power, but did so to protect the
country. And because of that, history has viewed them often as quite successful
not because they drew just on the power but because they matched the power to
great emergencies.
Some of our worst presidents have been of a set that felt constrained by the
understanding of constitutional law held at that time and felt that as President,
they could not do much, did not have the initiative. The most obvious example
would be President Buchanan, who as President thought he had no executive
power to try to bring together a summit of northern and southern leaders to try
to head off the Civil War.
Our greatest President is probably Abraham Lincoln, and look at some of the
things he did at the start of the Civil War. In response to the Civil War, he
removed money out of the Treasury without an appropriation, which is a direct
violation of the Constitution. He raised an army without congressional permis-
sion. He put up a blockade and he invaded the South, all without any kind of
congressional permission. He also instituted military detention, not just of
Confederate soldiers but of people who were rebels and sympathizers behind
Union lines. And he created a system of military commissions to try thousands
of people outside the civilian system. He did not ask for congressional permis-
sion for the military detention and trial system until 1863.6E
The executive role in war does not extend merely to the start of the war, but
grows even stronger over the conduct of the war. President Lincoln, in his
commander-in-chief power, freed the slaves. The Emancipation Proclamation
was issued pursuant solely to the President's commander-in-chief power. It
seems to me a theory that would say the commander-in-chief power essentially
has no substance other than to make the President the top general fails to
account for the Civil War. Would you be willing to reverse all of these decisions
that Lincoln had made on his own authority?
Let's turn to a more modern hero of Progressives everywhere, Franklin
Roosevelt, who's an even clearer case of a president acting against laws in order
to protect the country. I think these days we often forget the lead-up to World
War II. In the lead-up to World War II, Congress passed a series of neutrality
acts designed to prevent the United States from entering into the War. President
Roosevelt-I think many people now believe-violated those laws and pro-
vided destroyers to the British and aid to the Allies. He essentially moved the
United States Navy into a shooting war with German submarines in the Atlantic
well before Pearl Harbor in order to protect convoys to Great Britain.
President Bush, I'm afraid, was not the first person to think of this idea of
warrantless wiretapping. In May 1940, over a year and a half before Pearl
Harbor, President Roosevelt ordered J. Edgar Hoover to conduct interception
68. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR: A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND MILITARY HISTORY 1190-91
(David Steven Heidler & Jeanne Heidler eds., 200 1).
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not of just international phone calls but every communication in the United
States, all phone calls in the United States, to search for "subversive elements"
who would be helping the Axis powers during the War.6 9 At that time, there was
a statute that prohibited any warrantless interception of calls. 70 There wasn't
even a FISA at the time, and there was a Supreme Court decision concluding
that the President and the Executive Branch could not seek that kind of
authority.7' Now if you look at the memoirs of Justice Jackson, who was
Attorney General at that time, he talked to members of Congress quietly about
getting Congress to approve that program. He was told the members of Con-
gress would not vote for it, and so he decided that the Executive Branch and the
Justice Department would continue to do it anyway.
72
President Roosevelt also, in addition to these other things, detained an
American citizen without a civilian jury trial. He sent the citizen and his fellow
Nazi saboteurs into a military court in the case of Quirin.7 3 Again, the President
had to draw on these authorities to respond to these great emergencies to the
United States and its national security. Underthe vision that some of the Bush
Administration's critics have sketched, you would constrain the ability of
Roosevelt or Lincoln to respond to the Civil War or World War II in the most
effective way to protect the country.
Bringing us forward to the Cold War period, presidents often used their
authority unilaterally in ways that we have come to admire and praise. Think
about President Kennedy in the Cuban missile crisis. President Kennedy didn't
check with Congress. He didn't get legislative authorization. If you think about
it, the "quarantine" was a species of preemptive war. The Soviet Union was
trying to base nuclear missiles in Cuba. It wasn't about to imminently launch
them. We put up a blockade around Cuba, which is an act of war, in order to
forestall a serious change in the balance of power. President Kennedy not only
put up a blockade unilaterally, but he determined all of the rules of engagement,
he made all the tactical and strategic decisions, as a commander-in-chief would,
and we all think of this as the greatest moment of Kennedy's leadership in his
presidency.
Let me just turn to the future. I quite agree with Roger that the war powers
and these questions are to be determined by the political process. When the
President and Congress use their constitutional powers to cooperate or fight
about war policy, what makes this war different or unusual is not just the nature
of the enemy, which is very different, and the nature of the conflict, which is
based on secrecy and intelligence rather than out-producing the enemy or
fielding larger armies, but also the way that the courts have imposed a more
intrusive species of review on the Executive and Congress. You can just see that
69. Yoo, supra note 27, ch. 5.
70. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 605, 48 Stat. 1064, 1103-04 (1934).
71. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 339-41 (1939).
72. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THAT MAN: AN INSIDER'S PORTRAIr OF FRANKuN D. ROOSEVELT 69 (2003).
73. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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in a series of exchanges between the courts and Congress and the Executive
Branch over the detention issue and the role of habeas corpus.
At the end of World War II, the Supreme Court decided not to exercise
judicial review over enemy alien combatants held outside the United States, and
that was the law established in 1950, if not earlier, in a case called Johnson v.
Eisentrager.' When we were in the administration, we based a lot of these
decisions on World War H decisions, like Eisentrager. I think the court in Rasul
two years ago effectively overruled that decision sub silentio and suggested that
the writ of habeas corpus would extend to anybody held by the United States
anywhere in the world, something that the World War II Supreme Court clearly
rejected.75
Congress overruled Rasul, or tried to overrule Rasul.76 The Supreme Court in
Hamdan this summer,77 tried to ignore the clear congressional commands in the
Detainee Treatment Act, and then Congress just a month and a half ago
overruled the Court again because Congress has control over the jurisdiction of
the courts.78 That's a complicated issue that I can't get to today. I think it's
extraordinary to think about this if you compare it to the Civil War or World
War II. The idea that the courts are now, at least twice, and perhaps in the future
a third time, struggling with Congress to try to narrow its policy decisions,
where Congress is trying to support the decisions of the Executive Branch in
wartime. The thing that troubles me is that the courts are constructing a rule
demanding clear statements from Congress and to impose a peacetime system
which requires a series of very precise rules to govern the war on terrorism.
Does it make more sense? I think war requires legal rules that provide the
Executive Branch a lot of discretion and a fair amount of room to run in trying
to flexibly meet those challenges.
Thank you.
JUDGE PRYOR: I want to give the panel an opportunity of about two
minutes each to respond to some of what they've already heard, beginning with
you, Professor Epstein.
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN: I think it is somewhat extraordinary to hear this
constant praise of presidents who have managed to violate the Constitution in
the course of war, particularly since it's not at all clear to me that those parallels
are exact to the ones that we face today. So let me just start with a couple of
simple observations.
First on the comparison between executive power and the congressional
74. 339 U.S. 763, 777-78, 785 (1950).
75. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,480-81 (2004).
76. See Detainee Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001-06, 119 Stat. 2739, 2740 (2005).
77. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2764 (2006).
78. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, §§ 7, 9, 120 Stat. 2600, 2601-03,
2635-37 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C § 948a-d); see also Jesse H. Choper & John Yoo, Wartime Process:
A Dialogue on Congressional Control of the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 CAL. L. REv __
(forthcoming 2007).
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power, I strongly disagree with Roger that somehow or other the modem
struggle is just a replay of the Progressive Era with respect to the Commerce
Clause. When I read the phrase "to make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces, ' 79 I don't think of setting up a set of
tribunals to handle court-martials. That's done elsewhere in the Constitution
where the Congress receives the power to "constitute Tribunals inferior to the
supreme Court."'80 I think in effect that the distribution of powers, as originally
understood, was without any doubt, what I said before: the basic rules of the
game are going to be set by the Congress, and the President, both as'a duty and
a right, has to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. That general
command includes the laws that deal with the regulation and operation of
military forces in time of war.
To the extent, therefore, that FISA contains an explicit command that ad-
dresses this topic, and a president who decides to disregard that law, his actions
raise a very serious challenge to our constitutional order. One ought not to be so
cavalier with language and to argue that for reasons of current necessity a
commander-in-chief power, which looks to be one to execute rather than one to
frame policy, is in effect a giant club that operates free of constitutional
constraint.
The second point goes to the position of individual claimants seeking habeas
corpus. Again one has to be very clear. Cases like Johnson v. Eisentrager8 1 did
not deal with the legality of the detention, in the sense that there was no dispute
as to whether or not these detainees were German nationals who fought against
the United States. Their incarceration was also extraterritorial. Guantnamo Bay
will not be treated, I think, as though it's extraterritorial with respect to whether
habeas corpus will reach these cases.8 2 And in terms of the question of saying
that the attack of 9/11, which took place over five years ago places us in a
perpetual state of war, I think that broad proposition misconstrues very seriously
what was at stake in the original idea of an emergency exception to the
requirement that the President needs a declaration of war in order to act.
Any sudden attack does not afford the luxury. So of course the President
better act with dispatch because there is no one else who could do so. That
proposition has never been disputed by anybody on either side of this debate.
But when five years go by and there is simply a cat-and-mouse game in which
nobody wants to speak out, then you really do want some congressional
authorization for further action. One should fault the President very seriously
79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
80. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 9; see id. art. III, § 1.
81. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
82. But see Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 986-87, 989-91 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that the
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (MCA) stripped federal courts
of habeas jurisdiction over detainees held at Guantanamo Bay and that the MCA did not violate the
Suspension clause because habeas does not apply to those held outside U.S. sovereignty, including
military bases leased from foreign governments).
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for not going to Congress and saying he needs to revise these laws. It is not as
if, as John suggests, that you want the administration to explain exactly every
intelligence technique it possesses. It surely is not supposed to do that-
JUDGE PRYOR: I'm going to have to end your filibuster again.
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN: -but to act under circumstances where they make
clear what the rules should be. I do think that this impasse is a real national
tragedy.
DR. PILON: Well, let me start by commending Richard for pointing to the
difficult problem of resolving the tension between the history surrounding these
issues and his reading of the Constitution, which suggests that maybe the
problem is in his reading of the Constitution. And on that I will point to
something he just said concerning rules for the government and regulation of
the armed forces. That Article I power has always been understood to allow
Congress to establish rules like the Uniform Code of Military Justice. I refer
you to the essay on the subject in The Heritage Guide to the Constitution, which
discusses that clause in some detail and then gives further references on the
point. 8
3
Richard also talked about how low-level actions could be taken without a
declaration of war. That would get us into the kind of line-drawing problem that
would eventually end up in the courts, and the courts are the least qualified
branch to make that kind of judgment. That is simply a non-justiciable issue,
even if it were a correct reading of the Declare War Clause. The President has a
wide range of foreign affairs powers--everything from diplomacy to the Ko-
rean War-by way of conducting foreign policy. When you invite micromanage-
ment of that by the Court, you're asking for something that I think none of us
wants. Indeed, in Campbell v. Clinton the court addressed the issue and said that
it is a political question.84
With respect to some of the points Geoffrey made, I would note that the Keith
case involved a domestic threat. 85 The Court there clearly distinguished the
power to address that situation under the ordinary law enforcement paradigm
versus the power to do so under the foreign affairs paradigm.86 And every other
court, as the In re Sealed Case appellate opinion made clear,87 has done the
same thing-made that clear distinction between domestic law enforcement, on
one hand, and foreign affairs or national security, on the other.
I would just close with one point, in two parts. Are we to conclude from what
the other side has said that all these undeclared wars were unconstitutional-
that they were all examples of unconstitutional power? Second, are we to
83. David F. Forte & Mackubin Owens, Military Regulations, in TiH HERITAGE GuiDE TO THE
CONSTrLmON 136-38 (Edwin Meese III et al. eds., 2005).
84. 203 F.3d 19, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("[T]he War Powers Clause claim implicates the political
question doctrine.") (Silberman, J., concurring).
85. United States v. United States Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
86. Id. at 308-15.
87. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).
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suppose that FISA should have controlled everything in its domain over the past
year-the period since the New York Times first broke the story, during which
Congress has been unable to come up with any revision of the statute? 88 Should
the President have stopped the surveillance? I daresay that in the world in which
we live today, I don't think there are many in this room who would call for that,
and I hope the other side would not call for it either.
JUDGE PRYOR: Geof.
PROFESSOR STONE: I would. I think it's illegal, and I think therefore
Congress would act one way or another if, in fact, the President stopped the
program. But by continuing the program, he makes it unnecessary for Congress
to address the issue.
I also want to respond briefly to John's invocation of Lincoln and Roosevelt.
Because people admire Roosevelt and Lincoln does not mean they should or do
admire everything they did. They were both, in their own way, great presidents,
but that does not mean that the internment of Japanese-Americans or the
suspensions of the writ of habeas corpus in the middle of the Civil War were
justified. So it's possible to be a great president and also to make some terrible
blunders, and I think in both Roosevelt's and Lincoln's cases, that's clearly the
case.
The invocation of cases like Quirin and Johnson v. Eisentrager poses an
interesting question. 89 These are cases that go back 60-some years. But constitu-
tional law, for better or worse-and many people may say for the worse-has
changed profoundly over that period of time. The notion that one would invoke
a 60-year-old constitutional precedent and assume that it necessarily disposes of
a question today wouldn't be true in almost any area of constitutional law, and I
see no reason to assume it should be true with either Johnson or Quirin. That
isn't to say they were wrong or that a court shouldn't reach the same result
today, or that they have no precedential value. But our entire constitutional
system has radically changed, and we therefore should not slavishly follow
decisions that were reached in a different constitutional world.
JUDGE PRYOR: Professor Yoo.
PROFESSOR YOO: I'll waive my time for the audience.
JUDGE PRYOR: All right, now one of the favorite times. All right, I'm going
to remind every questioner of one thing: Ask a question.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Judge, we always follow your orders. Princi-
pally for Geof and Roger, could Congress amend FISA to constitutionally
provide that except for 15 days after it declared war, the President has to go to
this newly named FISA and Collateral Damage Bombing Court to get approval
for every single one of his bombings during such a war, except maybe he could
get 72 hours to continue certain ones that he can't get prior approval for? And if
88. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers without Courts, N.Y. TLmEs, Dec.
16, 2005, atAl.
89. Exparte Quiin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 229 U.S. 763 (1950).
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not, why is that any more in the core of the commander-in-chief power than
military intelligence decisions to determine who is and is not the enemy?
PROFESSOR STONE: I would say that the hypothetical statute is unconstitu-
tional because it intrudes too directly on the core of the commander-in-chief
power. The distinction I would draw is that decisions about where and when to
bomb in the midst of a conflict are very different from deciding whether to
engage in, electronic surveillance of American citizens on American soil. They're
both related to the fighting of the war, but one is much more bound up in ;at is
at the core of what a commander-in-chief does. And I agree with Richard that
the commander-in-chief is much more like a senior admiral or a senior general
than like the commander-in-chief of the nation.
So we need to draw lines between the core of the commander-in-chief power-
and the outer boundaries of that power. If Congress decides and the President
agrees that the President should not engage in surveillance of American citizens
on American soil, that limitation is constitutional but that authority is not at the
core of the commander-in-chief power.
DR. PILON: Geof and Richard are taking the domestic model and transpos-
ing it over to the international foreign affairs side, and I think that's the
fundamental mistake that we're seeing here. The Framers, and Locke too, were
quite clear on the point that particular rules are not the way you handle foreign
affairs.90 The Framers were very clear that the President has the primary
responsibility here, and Congress's powers are to be narrowly construed. 91 That
kind of a statute, it seems to me, Todd, would be clearly unconstitutional.
Let me also respond to something Geoffrey said about the President agreeing
to something like the FISA statute. When the Carter administration agreed to
that bill, Attorney General Griffin Bell made it very clear that he did not
understand it to be intruding on the inherent foreign intelligence gathering
powers of the president.92 And of course the point has never been tested. The
FISA appellate court's opinion in In re Sealed Case, which is the most definitive
opinion on FISA, was a test with respect to the Fourth Amendment, not with
respect to the separation of powers issue.93
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN: Could I make a comment? I think in effect-
JUDGE PRYOR: Professor Epstein has pulled out his copy of the Constitu-
tion, printed by the Cato Institute.
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN: -it's the Cato-
DR. PILON: It's the Cato Constitution.
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN: -which Roger ought to read.
90. As Locke put it regarding what he called the "federative power" (the power of dealing with
foreign affairs), "it is much less capable to be directed by antecedent, standing, positive Laws, than [by]
the Executive; and so must necessarily be left to the Prudence and Wisdom of those whose hands it is
in, to be managed for the publick good." LocKE, supra note 25, 147.
91. See THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton); JEFFERSON, supra note 42.
92. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).
93. Id.
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DR. PILON: My son once asked me, "Daddy, did you write 'We the
people."' How could I disappoint him?
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN: Well, he's rewriting it.
One of the points that is so striking about the document is that nowhere does
it say that the foreign affairs of the United States shall be vested in the President
of the United States. It says the President shall have the power to receive
ambassadors, to make treaties subject to the consent and so forth.9 4 One practice
that you have to worry about in all of these analyses is taking particular clauses
that are narrow in their scope and then giving them very broad readings, so as to
create the impression that somehow or other all foreign affairs belong to the
President. That's not there, nor should it be there. We do have a division of
powers, and I think what one has to ask is how we respect it.
This, then leads to the other point. There's nothing in the Constitution which
says that the powers of Congress in Article I with respect to the regulation of
war shall be narrowly construed. What's really happening in the administration
is that it insists that explicit powers should be narrowly construed while implied
powers should be broadly construed. That's a very dangerous way to undertake
constitutional interpretation.
JUDGE PRYOR: John.
PROFESSOR YOO: Just a brief point about Richard's comment. He's really
illustrating, I think quite well, the difference between textualism and original-
ism because he has pulled out a little Constitution and started reading the text
without any mooring in the context of how it was written and the understand-
ings of the time. And I know he doesn't carry the Federalist Papers around with
him because he didn't refer to how they referred to the Executive and the
understanding of Executive control of foreign affairs. You look at the British
practice and you look at what people said. There's no one in the framing of
debates who calls the foreign affairs power a congressional power. Instead, it's
thought to be by all philosophers of the time, and in British practice, an
executive power. And then the Framers vested the executive power, all execu-
tive power, in the President, in contrast to Article I, which says the legislative
Powers herein enumerated are vested in the Congress, and there has to be
some-
9 5
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN: This is-
JUDGE PRYOR: Go ahead, Richard.
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN: -Look, I mean when you read Federalist 69, the
one thing they do is explicitly reject the British analogy with respect to the
distribution of powers. 96 Their attitude is the commander-in-chief is the most
important general in the entire system. It is not that he is some kind of
94. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. II, § 3.
95. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress .. "); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819).
96. THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton).
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ibermensch. He's the commander-in-chief of the army and naval forces; he's
not the commander-in-chief of the United States.
DR. PILON: The Madison quote I gave you earlier 97 goes exactly opposite
what Richard just said, and of course every decision since then does as well. 98
JUDGE PRYOR: Well, at least Professor Epstein has now referred to the
Federalist Papers.
Next question.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Good morning. This question is directed to
Professor Yoo, but I'd like the other panelists to comment if they so choose. My
question has to do with the Military Commission Act of 2006.99 It's a question I
asked yesterday but didn't get a very satisfactory answer.
PROFESSOR YOO: You didn't ask me though.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: My question has to do with the presidential
power and the jurisdiction, specifically, of military commissions to prosecute
for violations of the laws of war. Under pre-existing Supreme Court precedent
and under the laws of war, the president had authority to institute military
commissions to try unlawful enemy combatants, whether alien or citizen. Under
the Military Act of 2006, they specifically excluded citizen unlawful enemy
combatants because the jurisdiction only has to do with alien unlawful enemy
combatants.' °° And my question is, in doing so, did they effectively adopt
Justice Scalia's dissent in Hamdi,'1 which said, if you have citizen unlawful
enemy combatants, they have to be tried for treason in a civilian court as
opposed to a military tribunal?
PROFESSOR YOO: That's a good question. I don't know if I read the
Military Commission Act that way. It defines illegal enemy combatants and then
legal enemy combatants, and I believe also makes clear that Al Qaeda fighters
are illegal enemy combatants and they're subject to military commission trial. ' 02
I don't think it draws the distinction you're talking about in terms of who's
subject to the commissions.
The distinction you're talking about is drawn, I think, in the writ of habeas
corpus, so the thing that's actually extraordinary about the Act is that it
overrules the Supreme Court's previous case that said alien enemy combatants
on U.S. territory could still file for a writ. And that's really what Rasul and
Hamdi were about.' °3 If you read the MCA closely, it actually removes the right
of aliens who are enemy combatants to file for a writ of habeas corpus even if
they're in the United States.' 4
97. See THE DOCuMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 30.
98. See, e.g., United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
99. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
100. See id.
101. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102. 10 U.S.C.S. § 948(a) (LexisNexis 2007).
103. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507.
104. 28 U.S.C.S. § 2241(e)(1) (LexisNexis 2007).
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AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Actually, it does. In the personal jurisdiction of
the Act, it says "alien unlawful enemy combatants."' 5 It specifically excludes
citizen enemy combatants.
PROFESSOR YOO: I would have go back to check. The other thing I would
say is that this may also be just because President Bush's original order also
said citizens who are illegal enemy combatants would not be tried by military
commission. 10 6 And in asking for Hamdan's repeal, he said he would not do
that. And so in seeking support from Congress for the system he put together, I
wouldn't think he would ask for it anyway, but I don't think that means he's
given up any constitutional authority to-
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: I guess that's my question-
JUDGE PRYOR: We've got the room until 10:30. We need to make both the
questions and answers as brief to allow as many as we can. Jerry Waltham.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: This is addressed to Professors Stone and
Epstein. I noticed that neither of you referred to the famous Justice Jackson and
Justice Goldberg statement that the Constitution is not a suicide pact.10 7 I
notice, in that regard, that Professor Stone claimed the reason our administration
didn't go to Congress for approval of a change of FISA was purely politics.
Would you comment on whether there isn't some basis for not going to
Congress to tell the world what methods the government is using in order to
defeat the enemy, that is, the Surveillance Act, the wiretapping? And the second
part of the question is, given your statement about Abe Lincoln being a great
president but he might have done things unconstitutionally, would you favor a
statute now similar to that granted to Japanese-Americans, compensating south-
ern slave owners for the unconstitutional deprivation of property in the slaves
because that was, at that time, property?
PROFESSOR STONE: Obviously, on the latter question, that was a serious
issue at the time-whether the government could take property in that context.
Except for the passing of 150 years, a problem that also limits what we can and
should do about reparations for slavery, I don't think that's a crazy question at
all. I think that destroying the right of property in slavery states, where it was
legal, posed a serious question about whether that was a deprivation of property
without due process requiring compensation. But 150 years later it's no longer a
useful question, any more than it is on the reparations issue for slavery. But the
principle you raise is perfectly legitimate.
On the suicide pact question: Well, first of all, Attorney General Gonzales has
been quoted as saying that the reason the Bush administration didn't go to
Congress was because they didn't think they could get a law passed, that is, a
105. 10 U.S.C.S. § 948(c) (LexisNexis 2007).
106. Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the
War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,834 (Nov. 13, 2001).
107. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963).
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law to change FISA.10 8 But, beyond that, there's obviously a possibility that
seeking a change in FISA would have revealed information, the public disclo-
sure of which would have been harmful to national security. But I'm very
skeptical about that claim, because it's perfectly possible to amend the statute
without having to go into any of the technical details of the investigations
you're planning to do. You simply say you want to jettison the warrant and
probable cause requirements. You don't need to explain exactly what you're
doing and how you're doing it. So, I don't think the question of amending FISA
needed to pose any real danger to national security.
And third, I want to make a point that my colleague, Dick Posner, has made
in a book called Not a Suicide Pact-which is that in the War on Terrorism, it
may be much more important to prevent terrorists from using effective means of
communication than it is to actually catch them, so that if we alert them to the
fact that they can no longer safely use cell phones or e-mail, and they stop using
e-mail and cell phones, it would make it virtually impossible for them to be
effective.' 0 9 On that theory, we would want them to know that they should no
longer feel safe using these means of communication. Posner's argument is that,
as a national security matter, we might be better off deterring terrorists from
using these means of communication than occasionally catching one." o
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN: Look, if this point were seriously taken, then we
couldn't even have this discussion. But frankly, I had figured out that cell
phones would be an ideal mode of communication for terrorists independent of
any revelations by Congress. The position of taking that objection seriously
would mean that you couldn't even have a congressional oversight hearing to
talk about any of these issues because that simple discussion might tip your
hand.
We've dealt with intelligence issues in the CIA, with confidential hearings on
some parts of the agenda and public hearings on the others for centuries in and
out of war. It seems to me that there's no reason to suspend that practice or
repudiate the judgment that lies behind it when it comes to FISA and its
potential revision.
JUDGE PRYOR: Yes.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Professor Epstein, you had briefly mentioned
the idea that Guantdnamo should not be considered extraterritorial for the
purposes of habeas. How would you or anyone on the panel view habeas
petitions filed on behalf of the people in Baghram or Iraq, non-U.S. citizens? Is
there an extraterritorial problem or do you think those should be legitimately
considered by non-U.S. citizens?
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN: You are about to see my true "dovish" sentiments
108. See Press Briefing by Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez and General Michael Hayden,
Principal Deputy Director for National Intelligence (Dec. 19, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2005/12/print/20051219- l.html.
109. See RicHARD A. PosNER, NOT A SUc'mE PACt 78-79, 132-33, 142-43 (2006).
110. See id.
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on all these issues. The main question here concerns the conditions that have to
be satisfied before the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended consistent.with
the Constitution. The suspension clause contains no territorial limitation with
respect to its scope, so I think it's a perfectly natural reading to say wherever the
United States exerts power, there habeas corpus will run. Also, when you start
to look at the Due Process Clause it was-
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Wow.
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN: -I'm a wow guy.
But let me just make the rest of the argument; then we can figure whether it
holds up. Similarly, the Due Process Clause on its face does not apply only to
citizens. It applies to all persons. It, too, contains no territorial limitations.
Those two textual points don't mean that the "dueness" it requires doesn't take
into account territory or perhaps citizenship. in some way. But the thought that
somehow or other it's correct to read the due process clause to erect categorical
immunizations from review of individual detentions on either of those grounds
seems to me to be a mistake. Second, if you regard the issue of territory as
important, it seems to me that treating Guantd.namo, a place where we have
absolute and total control, as something not in American hands solely because
we might thereby offend Cuban sovereignty, contains so many levels of irony
that I don't know where to begin.
DR. PILON: Jerry, there is a school of thought that will not be happy until
soldiers are required to Mirandize those they capture on the battlefield.
(Applause.)
DR. PILON: I'm not one of them.
PROFESSOR YOO: The main point is Richard's approach and his interpreta-
tion here are inconsistent with originalism, even as he himself has practiced it.
The Supreme Court employs a broad interpretation of Commerce. Commerce
doesn't have any limitation written in it, but Richard actually favored a very
narrow interpretation of the Commerce Clause. Why? Because he looked at
how people understood the word "commerce" in the 18th century. He doesn't
say today what did the framers think the habeas corpus writ meant in the 18th
century? If you go back and look, there's no evidence of the use of habeas
corpus by enemy prisoners in wartime to seek their release because they were
unlawfully detained in an illegal war. Why weren't there millions of habeas
corpus petitions filed by German and Italian and Japanese prisoners in World
War II? This is extraordinary.
You really can't rip the text out of its historical context and give it this
unlimited reading.
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN: Look, John, there's a serious difference here. No
one is arguing that you're going to give habeas corpus to ask the question of
whether or not somebody is an enemy combatant when they're taken in
uniform. That's the only question that arose in the German cases. But in these
cases where you get people who are not in uniform, there is a genuine issue of
fact as to whether they're there by virtue of circumstance, or being falsely
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turned in by somebody for a reward, or by being enemy combatants. And the
question of whether or not they fall into a class of people who do not get
protection is a question for which I think they're entitled to have the protection
of independent review.
And I think the national security interests are at their low ebb in circum-
stances where you let people rot in Guantdnamo for five years when in fact
they're innocent bystanders, as opposed to dealing with people whom you
capture on the battlefields who are firing guns at you. And if we can't draw that
distinction, then we lose all sense of proportion about what is and is not liberty
and what is or is not consistent with our own traditions.
This is a country of limited government, and your position is sounding
awfully despotic to me.
(Applause.)
JUDGE PRYOR: Next question.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: I have just a very narrow question, I guess, for
Professor Stone. You referred before to perhaps considering cases like Quirin 1
as having less vibrancy and predicting outside of their particular facts because
of the passage of time, even though perhaps on some of those areas the Supreme
Court in particular hasn't really spoken so much-
JUDGE PRYOR: You need to get to the question.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: -in the intervening years. And I guess my
question is, is the same true of the Keith case?1 2 Thirty-four years have passed.
There have been a lot of expansions of exceptions to the warrant requirement,
and does this perhaps undermine the ability to apply Keith outside of its specific
circumstances?
PROFESSOR STONE: To the extent there have been relevant exceptions to
the warrant requirement that undermine anything said in Keith, I would agree
that that would be relevant to understanding its vitality today. I don't agree that
that's an accurate statement of the law in Keith, but to the extent-if it were
true, I think it would be relevant in deciding how much precedential force to
give Keith today.
JUDGE PRYOR: Last question.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: I have a question for Mr. Pilon. I'd like your
response to two matters which I think appear inconsistent with your position.
Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution explicitly says, "No State shall, without
the consent of Congress, engage in war unless actually invaded or in such
imminent danger as will not admit a delay." Why would the Framers have given
the authority to consent to engaging in war by a state if the power lay with the
Executive and not Congress?
Secondly, Louis Fischer, in his book on executive power, writes and docu-
ments that the Founding Fathers, when they were in office, when it really
111. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
112. United States v. United States Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
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counted-that is, Washington, Madison, Monroe, and Jefferson-all took the
position that they did not have the authority to wage, war without some form of
congressional authorization. Do you agree with his reading of history, and aren't
they in a better position than we are to tell us what they meant regarding the war
powers?
DR. PILON: The second question, the answer is no, I don't agree with Louis
Fischer's reading of the Declare War Clause, or with his interpretation of the
Founders' understanding when in office. Regarding your first question, obvi-
ously they were dealing under the Articles of Confederation with the governors
having the authority over the militias and with a weak central government, and
under the new Constitution they wanted to make sure that states were not off on
their own making foreign policy and waging wars that the federal government
would then have to address. And so they simply centralized it in the President,
but with-
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN: In the Congress.
DR. PILON: -No, not in the Congress. Richard, are you-
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN: (off mic.)
DR. PILON: -I know, but that does not mean that every act of the Executive
requires a declaration of war. I mean, let's think about what is entailed in that
view. With numerous federal statutes kicking in under a declaration of war 1 3 -
excuse me, you asked your question, let me answer-authorizing the federal
government to do everything from requisition ships and property and so forth,
do you really want a declaration of war every time we seize Noriega or
whatever the case may be?
JUDGE PRYOR: Professor Yoo-no, no. Thank you. The last sentence goes
to Professor Yoo.
PROFESSOR YOO: I just want to say I think Article I, Section 10 is
extremely important and a great point, but the question to ask is why would the
Framers have written such a precise provision saying that the states have to get
the consent of Congress, and include exceptions for invasion and imminent
danger, and then not write exactly the same provision with the presidency? I
think it's a negative implication that proves the exact opposite.
(Panel concluded.)
113. See supra note 31.
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